The "International Turn": A Reply to My Critics[1]

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Advances in historical scholarship may be made variously by innovation, by renovation or by realignment. Outright innovation may be the rarest of the three, but the revival of historical problems or the reorganisation of historical fields accounts for most of the energy that keeps the discipline moving forwards. In some areas, it can be appropriate to speak of the return of a historical approach: the "return of universal history", "the return of the history of ideas", or "the return of the *longue durée*", for example.[2] In others, and generally most frequently, it is usual to speak of historical "turns": the linguistic turn, the cultural turn, the imperial turn and the spatial turn, for instance.[3] In a recent forum on "Historiographic 'Turns' in Critical Perspective", one younger historian suggested two ways in which such movements might productively open up dialogue rather than close it down. First, he argued, "we need to employ the language of turns prospectively, to describe and debate change that is ongoing or just beginning" and, second, that "turning has to be framed within a non-supersessionist account of generational change: as a process of reinvention and reformulation of what

[1] Forthcoming in *Intellectual History* (Taipei), 1 (2013), in reply to comments by Peter K. Bol, Leigh Jenco, GE Zhaoguang, Viren Murthy and Lung-kee Sun on the Chinese translation of David Armitage, "The International Turn in Intellectual History", which appears in slightly different English versions in Armitage, *Foundations of Modern International Thought* (Cambridge, 2013), 17-32, and in Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn, eds., *Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History* (Oxford, 2013).
[2] David Christian, "The Return of Universal History", *History and Theory*, 49 (2010), 6–27; Darrin M. McMahon, "The Return of the History of Ideas?", in McMahon and Moyn, eds., *Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History*; David Armitage and Jo Guldi, "The Return of the *Longue Durée*", *Global History Review* (Beijing), 5 (2013).
[3] Judith Surkis, Gary Wilder, James W. Cook, Durba Ghosh, Julia Adeney Thomas and Nathan Perl-Rosenthal, "*AHR* Forum: Historiographic 'Turns' in Critical Perspective", *American Historical Review*, 117 (2012), 698–813.

came before, not a wholesale replacement of it".[4] It was very much in the spirit of these recommendations—forward-looking and constructive, respectful of alternative approaches but also building on existing achievements—that I wrote about the international turn in intellectual history. By taking such a turn, I argued, intellectual history might simultaneously innovate and renovate by realigning itself with other fields of inquiry, both historical and non-historical.

To reach these conclusions, "The International Turn in Intellectual History" swiftly surveyed the past, present and future of both international history and intellectual history in tandem. These two sub-fields of historical writing, I noted, have been through periods of mutual attraction and repulsion across the course of the last century but they now seem to enjoy increasingly fertile relations. I suggested that these emerging scholarly trends fulfilled a prediction I had made almost a decade ago—that there would be a revival of earlier conversations between diverse scholars in history, political theory, International Relations and international law.[5] And I argued that there was still much work to be done on what I have called elsewhere "the intellectual history of the international and an internationalised intellectual history": that is, on the history of intellectual reflection on the international realm on the one hand, and on intellectual history seen in its international contexts on the other.[6] I am delighted that the distinguished contributors to this roundtable have touched on both of these strands in their penetrating remarks. I am even more pleased that they mostly took my essay in the spirit in which it was meant. It is to their generous and challenging comments that I now turn.

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[4] Nathan Perl-Rosenthal, "Comment: Generational Turns", *American Historical Review*, 117 (2012), 813.
[5] David Armitage, "The Fifty Years' Rift: Intellectual History and International Relations", *Modern Intellectual History*, 1 (2004), 108–09.
[6] Armitage, *Foundations of Modern International Thought*, 7.

Peter K. Bol boldly asserts, "We are all international now".[7] Professor Bol is my esteemed Harvard colleague, and I regularly teach a globe-spanning, time-travelling graduate seminar on methods in intellectual history with him. As he so often does when we teach together, Professor Bol shows himself to be acutely aware of the challenges as well as the opportunities attending any expansion of horizons in space, time or research methods. His opening example of the unsolicited gift of a recent volume of *International Research on Confucian Learning* nicely illustrates this. The authors in this collection, he writes, "have adopted a framework that comes from outside the [Confucian] tradition they are writing about" and which is international only in the sense that it is external to Confucianism itself. This signifies to Professor Bol not cosmopolitanism, but instead a kind of derivative discourse: an attempt to adopt standards and protocols from outside one's own tradition in hopes of currying favour with those who have more power, more prestige or greater cultural capital. But, as Professor Bol also notes, this effort also indicates that "intellectual life in the world today is inevitably international", in the sense that ambitious intellectuals must now direct their arguments to potentially global audiences as well as to their compatriots or fellow language-speakers, just as philosophers might once have addressed posterity along with their own contemporaries.

Intellectual life today may be increasingly international but I am not certain that it is "*inevitably* international". In the epigraph to my essay, I quoted the sobering words of the French cultural sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, "It is often believed that intellectual life is spontaneously international. Nothing could be further from the truth."[8] Bourdieu argued that every text travels through a series of "gate-keepers"—the translators, editors and publishers who package, rearrange and circulate ideas in the material forms of books and journals. (We might also now add those who transmit them in their *immaterial* forms

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[7] Echoing the British Liberal politician Sir William Harcourt in 1889 ("We are all Socialists now") and possibly also myself, echoing Harcourt, in 2002 ("We are all Atlanticists now"): David Armitage, "Three Concepts of Atlantic History", in Armitage and Michael J. Braddick, eds., *The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800* (Basingstoke, 2002), 11.

[8] "On croit souvent que la vie intellectuelle est spontanément internationale. Rien n'est plus faux": Pierre Bourdieu, "Les conditions sociales de la circulation internationale des idées", *Romanistische Zeitschrift für Literaturgeschichte/Cahiers d'Histoire des Littératures Romanes*, 14 (1990), 2 (my translation).

across the world, by way of the Internet.) When texts move—or when they are moved—out of their original contexts, they acquire new meanings; they also create unanticipated effects as they break loose from the intentions of their creators. This certainly seems true of the examples Professor Bol cites in his remarks, of the journal *International Research on Confucian Learning* and of Jiang Qing's *Confucian Constitutional Order*, for example, works that take on very different meanings—when sent to academics in the United States or published in English—than they might possess in their original settings.[9] Only by being alert to the material processes of the distribution and reception of arguments can we begin to understand how intellectual life becomes international at all.

The internationalisation of intellectual life can take place over time as well as across space, as Professor Bol notes at the end of his remarks. Traditions endure but they also travel. As they travel, they mingle and converse with other traditions. Ideas and arguments can link communities together over thousands of years and over thousands of miles simultaneously. I have argued elsewhere for an approach to intellectual history which is transtemporal as well as transnational, tracking the history to be found "*in* ideas" as a methodological advance on the "history *of* ideas" associated with Arthur O. Lovejoy and his followers.[10] The biggest difference, it seems to me, between transtemporal and transnational intellectual history is suggested by the very last line of Professor Bol's response, where he notes that Chinese intellectual traditions might be brought into "a conversation that can be international without being unidirectional". International discourse, on a global scale, is by definition multidirectional, if not always without frictions or inequalities. By contrast, our encounter with the past takes place on a one-way street: it is transtemporal but it must be unidirectional because it is only in the present that we are able to reconstruct the past. We also cannot make the past international when it was not so—when it was national or imperial in orientation, for example. The alternatives to internationalism, and the resistance to it, thereby become

[9] Jiang Qing, *A Confucian Constitutional Order: How China's Ancient Past Can Shape its Political Future*, ed. Daniel A. Bell and Ruiping Fan, trans. Edmund Ryden (Princeton, NJ, 2012).
[10] David Armitage, "What's the Big Idea? Intellectual History and the *Longue Durée*", *History of European Ideas*, 38 (2012), 493–507.

subjects for intellectual history because, "for every concept that does globalize, others do not do so".[11]

It is in this regard that Ge Zhaoguang's remarks on the implications of the "international turn" for East Asian intellectual history are so illuminating. His main concern is that the new promise of international approaches to intellectual history should not ignore or supersede "national" approaches. Professor Ge asks, "Can the 'international turn' and 'national perspectives' co-exist mutually beneficially?" He answers in the affirmative, for two main reasons. One is quite familiar to Euro-American intellectual historians: that historians must always attend to context. The other is less obvious to such historians who, as Professor Ge notes, "have no personal experiences in great political coercion or suppression". For those of us fortunate enough to have lived and worked in liberal democracies with long-established guarantees of intellectual freedom and academic autonomy, it is important to be reminded that the power of the state (*guojia*) is much more invasive and present in other societies. In those cases, to concentrate on the state may be not only unavoidable: it is ethically indispensable.

I certainly feel the force of Professor Ge's argument and also agree with him that it would be a mistake to confuse "national intellectual history" with the broader methodological nationalism that has structured much work in history and allied social sciences in the past century or more. Indeed, I raised the spectre of methodological nationalism in my original essay only to show how intellectual history had largely avoided its shortcomings for most of its history as a field. However, I would still want to press further the logic of my own argument about the benefits of an international turn in light of Professor Ge's remarks: by stressing different conceptions of context, by questioning the implied unity of "nation" and "state", and by querying the presumed continuity of nationhood itself.

As a former student of Quentin Skinner, and now also as the co-editor of the monograph series he founded under the title "Ideas in Context",[12] I could hardly disagree

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[11] Samuel Moyn, "On the Non-Globalization of Ideas", in Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori, eds., *Global Intellectual History* (New York, 2013), 201.

[12] http://www.cambridge.org/gb/knowledge/series/series_display/item3937510/?site_locale=en_GB, accessed 1 March 2013.

with Professor Ge's endorsement of Skinner's "argument that ideas must be viewed in contexts". However, I would caution against assuming—as Professor Ge seems to do—that we should only identify contexts with "the *political* culture of the time" (my emphasis) or that they should be construed only, or even primarily, as "linguistic contexts". Both of these forms of context are, of course, crucially important to answer a wide variety of questions in intellectual history and to frame essential research topics. However, they are not exhaustive.

As well as political contexts, there are cultural, religious, institutional, and economic contexts, any or all of which might be larger or narrower than the political context defined by the boundaries of a state. And, as I argued in my original essay, contexts may be physical and spatial, as well as linguistic or conceptual: these contexts, too, may extend well beyond national borders or be as tightly defined as the spaces of a household, an academy, or any other institutionalised space. But Professor Ge is obviously well aware of this, as his closing example of Buddhism "travel[ling] over mountains and seas to land in Japan and Korea" shows. Contexts are not static and confining; they can be mobile, shifting and subject to change as well as agents of change in themselves. In those very features lies the difficulty of reconstructing them to interpret particular ideas, especially when multiple and overlapping contexts—some close at hand, others distant in time and space—give meaning to particular utterances.

Just as slippery are conceptions of the nation and the state. There is no necessary connection between these two entities. A robust literature has shown definitively how recent and how contingent is the association of state with nation: Max Weber classically summed up that relationship a century ago—"a nation is a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own; hence, a nation is a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own"—but this was still a relatively novel notion at the time that he wrote.[13] This bears upon Professor Ge's statement that "historical problems and ideas are always structured by *guojia*, due to great differences in national histories". If by "always" Professor Ge means "only", I would have to dissent; and if by "always", he means "in all times and places", modern and pre-modern, I would

[13] Max Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, new edn. (London, 1991), 176.

also have my doubts. Even in the case of China, we should surely ask if there is a difference between a nation (or a state) and an empire. The boundaries of "China" have shifted over the centuries, as different territories and peoples have come under the sway of successive dynastic and republican regimes. Migration has also created a global Chinese diaspora well beyond the boundaries of Chinese sovereignty. When should we then speak of "China" as a state, a nation, an empire, a civilisation, a linguistic community or a diaspora? Which of these many Chinas is under inspection will always need to be specified.

"National" contexts are only temporarily fixed and are not eternally continuous in time and space. This is not to say that I believe Professor Ge to be incorrect in his salutary reminder that national contexts should not be forgotten as intellectual historians take an international turn: I mean simply that one fruit of that international turn is a scepticism about the self-evidence or the naturalness of the nation itself as a category of contextual analysis. Conversely, because the very term "international" has "nation" at its heart, it is of course correct to hope, with Professor Ge, that "current international intellectual history can go hand in hand with studies of national intellectual history": it could hardly function any other way. However, it should encourage historians focused on national contexts to look for those ideas and arguments that cannot be contained within a national framework, either because they operate at levels lower than—and sometimes in opposition to—the nation/state, or because they extend above and beyond national contexts, like Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism, to mention only Professor Ge's key examples. And it should also alert them to what Leigh Jenco calls "the power relationships that create and reinforce boundaries around the spaces in and through which we perceive though to move, such as those of the nation-state". Nations are not natural, whatever nationalists might want us to think. Denaturalising the nation-state, not least by showing how it was produced by *international* relations of power, remains an ongoing task for all historians, and not for intellectual historians alone.

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Cosmopolitanism, internationalism, globalism and comparison have often been proposed as cures for nationalism, regionalism and other forms of intellectual parochialism. However, as Leigh Jenco notes, in the field of political theory, "internationalization has led primarily to a *reassertion* of European modes of knowing and the nation-state form, rather than their displacement or refiguration". She argues that the experience of political theory can offer a cautionary tale for intellectual historians who seek to internationalise their field: after all, if the only effect of taking an international turn is a return to the national (or, at least, a return to traditional canons and questions from Europe or the West more generally), might it not be a turn for the worse?

Dr Jenco is surely right to infer that the international turn in intellectual history has not gone far enough, and that parallel developments in political theory can provide vital inspiration for it to extend further. Historians—even intellectual historians—are not generally as self-reflexive as political theorists, in large part because we do not usually share the ambition to produce theory ourselves. However, the broader internationalisation of the historical discipline—with its progressive "de-centring" of the West and ever greater attention to the multiple and connected sites in the production of knowledge—cannot leave intellectual history untouched; it might also bring it into closer dialogue with political theory, as Jenco suggests. However, her remarks do offer some important warnings to intellectual historians who might want to pursue that rapprochement.

For example, I would not disagree with her that comparative political theory has a tendency towards reification and abstraction, though that is characteristic of the comparative method more generally and not unique to political theory. Comparative political theory often immobilises the traditions it juxtaposes. To facilitate comparison, a dynamic and developing family of Confucian heritages must be rendered static and schematic, for example. Parallel traditions must in turn be abstracted from history. Jenco suggests that a cosmopolitan turn in political theory has served mostly to affirm the centrality of western political theory to the academy: it has revealed political theory's global entanglements but it has not followed its own logic to consider seriously "the theoretical substance of ideas circulating elsewhere". As Jenco notes, attempts to specify the meaning and content of political theory by appeals to context (as in the work of Quentin Skinner) or to horizons of understanding (in the terms set by Hans-Georg

Gadamer) only serve to confine ideas, to prevent them from travelling.[14] They thereby stifle dialogue and interrupt any potential fusion of horizons.

I would also agree with Dr Jenco that "the spatialization of ideas has been interpreted by many political theorists as constraining rather than enabling the mobility of thought"—and not just by political theorists, it must be said, but by many historians as well: it was for that reason that I urged attention to broader and more dynamic conceptions of context in my original essay. However, I am a little more hopeful than Dr Jenco that the "global genealogy of political theory's long-held ideals" will not be overlooked for much longer.

Perhaps the most liberating result so far of the international turn in intellectual history has precisely been greater attention to non-Western genealogies and sources. To the examples Jenco herself mentions (mostly drawn from East Asia), I would add the work of Muzaffar Alam on Islamic political thought, Jennifer Pitts on the early nineteenth-century Algerian liberal Hamdan Khodja, C. A. Bayly's magisterial survey of Indian thought in the long nineteenth century, Pankaj Mishra's study of twentieth-century Asian anti-colonialism, and Karuna Mantena's reincorporation of Gandhi into the political theory of realism as an original and substantive theorist of means and ends in his own right.[15] Much of this work has appeared very recently or is still in progress—I therefore have high hopes for the achievement of what Jenco calls the "true 'internationalization'" of intellectual history (and political theory), "that is, the incorporation in a broader and more transformative way the insights located in truly global, rather than provincially western, spaces of thought". Dr Jenco's own recent work

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[14] James Tully, ed., *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics* (Oxford, 1988); Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd edn. (London, 2004).

[15] Muzaffar Alam, *The Languages of Political Islam, 1200-1800* (Delhi, 2004); Jennifer Pitts, "Liberalism and Empire in a Nineteenth-Century Algerian Mirror", *Modern Intellectual History*, 6 (2009), 287–313; C. A. Bayly, *Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire* (Cambridge, 2011); Pankaj Mishra, *From the Ruins of Empire: The Revolt Against the West and the Remaking of Asia* (London, 2012); Karuna Mantena, "Another Realism: The Politics of Gandhian Nonviolence", *American Political Science Review*, 106 (2012), 455–70; Mantena, *Gandhi's Realism: Means and Ends in Politics* (Cambridge, Mass., forthcoming).

on the political theory of Zhang Shizhao and on theoretical engagement across cultures strongly indicates that those hopes are far from being misplaced.[16]

Viren Murthy's richly thoughtful commentary only increases my confidence in the bright future of international intellectual history—and, indeed, the future of its close cousin, global intellectual history. Professor Murthy neatly inverts my closing remarks, which implied that a global turn is a logical *extension* of the international turn, by arguing that "globality forms the *condition* for the possibility of the international turn" itself (my emphasis). Murthy then enlists the help of two of the earliest global intellectual historians—Hegel and Marx—to propose capitalism as a "framework that could go beyond reductionism and open the way to a globally international intellectual history".

Professor Murthy notes some inevitable resistance to the use of capitalism as such a framework for intellectual history. Is it not reductionist? Does it not inevitably subsume the ideal in the material? Would not such an approach deny agency and autonomy? The objections are familiar and major programmes of research in intellectual history have been explicitly promoted as alternatives to specifically materialist analyses—I would think here, most obviously, of Skinner's early engagement with historiographies indebted to Marx and to Lewis Namier in favour of a more broadly Weberian approach, for example.[17] But arguments have moved on and Professor Murthy is now surely pushing at an open door. Any transnational turn in intellectual history—whether international or global in scope—surely needs to attend to global and local contexts simultaneously, at least in the modern period. What one sophisticated recent practitioner has called "global concept history" has brought about just such a convergence by applying a Marxian analysis of capitalism to the interregional movement and reception of ideas in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[18] And Hegel and Marx themselves have recently been

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[16] Leigh K. Jenco, *Making the Political: Founding and Action in the Political Theory of Zhang Shizhao* (Cambridge, 2010); Jenco, "Recentering Political Theory: The Promise of Mobile Locality", *Cultural Critique*, 79 (2011), 27–59; Jenco, "How Meaning Moves: Tan Sitong on Borrowing across Cultures", *Philosophy East and West*, 62 (2012), 92–113.

[17] Mark Goldie, "The Context of *The Foundations*", in Annabel Brett and James Tully, eds., *Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought* (Cambridge, 2006), 3–19.

[18] Andrew Sartori, *Bengal in Global Concept History: Culturalism in the Age of Capital* (Chicago, 2008).

productively treated as subjects for international and global intellectual history themselves.[19] Professor Murthy's brief and suggestive account of Hegel as a global historian of a sort and his treatment of the phenomena of reification in capitalism and in intellectual history add measurably to this emerging body of work.

Professor Murthy rightly calls capitalism "the structuring dynamic of our age" but the early modern historian in me wants to ask just how far back "our age" extends in this sense. As world-systems theorists, among others, have reminded us, the history of globalisation can be told as the story of the gradual incorporation of all parts of the world—"centres" and "peripheries"—into the capitalist world-system over the course of the last five centuries. But this was a gradual process that could hardly be called comprehensively global before the nineteenth century: in this sense, Marx himself was generalising transhistorically from the relatively novel conditions of his own time.[20] There is, of course, a larger question about whether globalisation should necessarily be identified with capitalism at all and how far back we can go in time and still speak of globalisation itself.[21] But if we are to follow Professor Murthy's suggestions, and see capitalism as the precondition of globality, and globality as the backdrop for international intellectual history, we might risk compressing in time an approach that is expansive in space. After all, if capitalism cannot be seen as a global condition before the era of the telegraph, the railroad and the steamship, does this mean the international turn cannot be applied to any period before the Marx's maturity in the mid-nineteenth century? That doubt aside, I would strongly endorse Professor Murthy's sense that "recent intellectual history has had difficulty or has not even tried to think of place/space and time

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[19] For example, Susan Buck-Morss, *Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History* (Pittsburgh, 2009); Kevin B. Anderson, *Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-Western Societies* (Chicago, 2010).

[20] On Marx as a theorist of globalisation, see especially Gareth Stedman Jones's introduction to his edition of *The Communist Manifesto*: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (1848), ed. Gareth Stedman Jones (Harmondsworth, 2002).

[21] A. G. Hopkins, "Introduction: Globalization—An Agenda for Historians", and C. A. Bayly, "'Archaic' and 'Modern' Globalization in the Eurasian and African Arena, *c*. 1750-1850", in Hopkins, ed., *Globalization in World History* (London, 2002), 1–10, 47–73; Joyce E. Chaplin, *Round About the Earth: Circumnavigation from Magellan to Orbit* (New York, 2012); David Armitage, "Is There a Pre-History of Globalisation?", in Armitage, *Foundations of Modern International Thought*, 33–45.

globally"—and that it should attempt to do so, as some international relations theorists have recently tried to do.[22] I am not yet fully persuaded that international intellectual history depends upon globality, whether material or conceptual, but after reading Professor Murthy's remarks, I am even more convinced that a *global* turn in intellectual history is now an essential move for our field.[23]

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To clarify my own arguments before I conclude, let me turn finally to Dr Lung-kee Sun's remarks. Dr Sun's commentary contains so many misunderstandings of my intentions and my own statements that as I read it I began to doubt whether I had expressed myself at all clearly in my original essay. Dr Sun infers that I do "not go for" global history, though he may not be aware that I have written one work of global intellectual history and co-edited another collection of essays in the field.[24] He states that I have my own "special brand of international history" (which may be true) and then suspects that my own aim is "an effort to jumpstart the decrepit field of diplomatic history" (which is certainly not correct).

I am at a loss to see how any part of my essay—or indeed anything else I have ever written—could be seen as directed towards that goal. I had thought it was evident that I wrote primarily as an intellectual historian—my essay was, after all, entitled "The International Turn in Intellectual History" not "The Intellectual Turn in International History" (though such an approach would itself be quite plausible and timely).[25] I am not now, nor have I ever been, a diplomatic historian. I have no intention of "weav[ing] various affiliated strands together to re-mat the field of international relations" (whatever

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[22] Most notably, Jens Bartelson, *Visions of World Community* (Cambridge, 2009).
[23] Compare the essays in Moyn and Sartori, eds., *Global Intellectual History*.
[24] David Armitage, *The Declaration of Independence: A Global History* (Cambridge, Mass., 2007); Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, eds., *The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c. 1760-1840* (Basingstoke, 2010). See also Jaap Jacobs and Martine van Ittersum, "Are We All Global Historians Now? An Interview with David Armitage", *Itinerario*, 36 (2012), 7–28.
[25] Duncan Snidal and Alexander Wendt, "Why There is *International Theory* Now", *International Theory,* 1 (2009), 1–14; Thomas W. Zeiler, "The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A State of the Field", *Journal of American History*, 95 (2009), 1053–73.

that might mean). My aim was simply to encourage intellectual historians to diversify their approaches by drawing inspiration from some recent and novel advances in the internationalisation of historical scholarship more broadly. My other commentators understood this aim quite well, so I am reassured that Dr Sun's misapprehension of my argument was not entirely my own fault.

I wish I could share Dr Sun's confidence that academic divisions of labour are clear and unproblematic and that so many historical problems have already been solved that little further work is necessary. I would be fascinated to learn of intellectual histories on international institutions written before the last decade: of course such organisations have long been the objects of historical research, but I am aware of little work on them by intellectual historians, or by international historians using the tools of intellectual history, until very recently.[26] Dr Sun claims that international thinkers from Norman Angell and Hannah Arendt to Leonard Woolf and Alfred Zimmern are "standard fare" in institutes of International Relations—again, I would like to know where—and he also asserts that their "intellectual biographies are in place", implying research on them might now cease. If so, that news has not reached the cadre of scholars who are working mightily to recover the international thought of these figures from the condescension of posterity. And Dr Sun has much greater confidence than I in the talents and capacities of fellow historians if he believes that paying "attention to migrations, diasporas, and epidemics" requires nothing more than a "relatively simple retooling" on the part of national historians. If only the internationalisation of national history were so easy, every national history would be written with such transnational phenomena in mind. For the moment, at least, regrettably few still are.

Dr Sun also takes me to task for, as he sees, it "diminishing" Europe by downplaying the nation while at the same time localising and essentialising the Enlightenment. I am at a loss to know what Dr Sun means by these accusations, but I am confident they are based on a series of non sequiturs with no foundation in my own essay.

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[26] In addition to the works cited in my original article, see now also Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (London, 2012), Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia, 2013), and the recently launched United Nations History Project website: http://unhistoryproject.org/index.html, accessed 1 March 2013.

I cannot understand how "to diminish the 'nation' is to diminish Europe": scepticism about the nation as the sole unit of history extends well beyond Europe, as Dr Sun's own reference to Prasenjit Duara's *Rescuing History from the Nation* (1995) testifies.[27] I have also never thought of the Enlightenment as "a monolith confinable somewhere in space and time" and again fail to see how my essay could be read as if I did believe that. When I stated that, "to answer the question, 'What was Enlightenment?', intellectual historians attuned to space must now also ask, '*Where* was Enlightenment?'", I was (admittedly rather briskly) summarising a rich vein of recent work which has examined the circulation of ideas, the geographical distribution of intellectual institutions, and the transnational, even global, reach of Enlightenment: work which has been immeasurably expanded by the application of digital methods of network analysis and data visualisation in such projects as *Six Degrees of Francis Bacon* at Carnegie Mellon University, *Royal Society Comparative Trajectories* at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, *The Republic of Letters* at Stanford University, *Cultures of Knowledge* at the University of Oxford, and *The Circulation of Knowledge* at various institutions in the Netherlands.[28]

Far from confining or "essentialising" Enlightenment, this scholarship stresses its mobility and variety as well as its extension across and well beyond Europe.[29] Any reading of this work would reassure Dr Sun that it does not "hypostatize superordinate units overarching the nation" but instead uses methods of comparison and connection to reveal the many different communities—national, subnational and supranational—where

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[27] Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago, 1995).

[28] http://sixdegreesoffrancisbacon.com/; http://dataminding.org/Network8/index.html#; https://republicofletters.stanford.edu/; http://cofk.history.ox.ac.uk/; http://ckcc.huygens.knaw.nl/, accessed 1 March 2013.

[29] In addition to the works cited in my original essay, see, for example, John Robertson, *The Case for the Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples 1680-1760* (Cambridge, 2005); Charles W. J. Withers and Robert Mayhew, "Geography: Space, Place and Intellectual History in the Eighteenth Century", *Journal for Eighteenth Century Studies*, 34 (2011), 445–52; Mayhew, "Geography as the Eye of Enlightenment Historiography", *Modern Intellectual History*, 7 (2010), 611–27; Sebastian Conrad, "Enlightenment in Global History: A Historiographical Critique", *American Historical Review*, 117 (2012), 999–1027; Caroline Winterer, "Where is America in the Republic of Letters?", *Modern Intellectual History*, 9 (2012), 597–623; Anthony Pagden, *The Enlightenment—And Why it Still Matters* (Oxford, 2013).

Enlightened ideas were discussed and implemented. In this regard, I would endorse the conclusion of one recent global historian that it was precisely the "process of global circulation, translation, and transnational co-production that turned the Enlightenment into the general and universal phenomenon that it had always purported to be."[30]

Indeed, it is surely Dr Sun himself who is guilty of hypostatisation and essentialism when he writes of "the time-honored and universal tropes of the Renaissance [and] the Enlightenment", as if these complex and internally contested traditions lacked any context yet had an agreed content. In the latter part of his essay, Dr Sun deploys these reifications to analyse May Fourth as a series of national movements within a transnational moment. He plots May Fourth alongside a broader polarisation of "Right" and "Left" in 1919, but offers no model to link events in Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan, China, and the United States. Does he imply a causal connection? A comparative framework? Or merely a set of coincidences?

Dr Sun does not tell us how we might answer such questions (as Professor Murthy in fact did), but only how we should *not* approach them: that is, he argues, against my own essay, we should *not* ask "how ideas were manufactured and how they travelled, who trafficked them and who consumed them". His only counterproposal to this allegedly "materialist" methodology is what he calls a "hermeneutic" handling. As far as I can infer from Dr Sun's remarks, "hermeneutic" here means being guided by imprecise appeals to distant Western models of "Renaissance" and "Enlightenment". Fortunately we do have more robust and revealing scholarship on the May Fourth movement that is properly attentive to the historical connections that made 1919 such a peculiarly charged moment for transnational and even global exchanges.[31] This work, so far mostly by international historians attuned to intellectual history, rather than by intellectual historians who have taken an international turn, offers much better guidance for the broader task of globalising intellectual history. In this way, it also addresses Professor

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[30] Conrad, "Enlightenment in Global History", 1027.

[31] Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford, 2007); Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought* (New York, 2007); Mishra, *The Ruins of Empire*, 184–215.

Murthy's important question of "why certain ideas could go global at a particular time", ideas such as revolution, nationalism and self-determination.[32]

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I am grateful to all the contributors to this forum for all their stimulating comments and criticisms. They have helped me to think more broadly, and I hope also more subtly, about the challenges the international turn presents, not just to intellectual history but also to national history and to political theory, for example. Their acute suggestions mark a major advance on my original essay. I wrote that piece from my position as what Peter Bol often calls "Mediterranean" intellectual history—that is, the history of Europe and the Americas—though I did try to account for some recent developments in other geographical fields. But a single overview, directed specifically towards thinking about the implications of the international turn for *European* intellectual history, obviously could not account for all the implications of a complex shift in historical attention that is changing history writing across the world.[33] The varied perspectives offered by this diverse group of scholars of Asian intellectual history collectively accomplish what my own essay could not achieve: the internationalisation of intellectual history itself. If my modest effort at synthesis and prognosis helped to inspire that major advance in historical dialogue, then I am more confident than ever that the international turn has indeed been a turn for the better.

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[32] Compare Cemil Aydin, "Globalizing the Intellectual History of the Idea of the 'Muslim World'", in Moyn and Sartori, eds., *Global Intellectual History*, 159–86.

[33] The essay was first presented at a 2010 workshop on "Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History for the Twenty-First Century", reconsidering the field almost thirty years after the publication of Dominick LaCapra and Steven L. Kaplan, eds., *Modern European Intellectual History: Reappraisals and New Perspectives* (Ithaca, NY, 1982).